LL: This is Thursday, October 14, Luane Lange interviewing Stan Seaver for the Connecticut 20th Century Agricultural History Project. Stan, thank you very much for agreeing to do this. Would you start out...Stan is an emeritus of the College of Agriculture and would you tell us where you attended college?

SS: The University of Minnesota from 1935 to 1940.

LL: What were your majors? Did you get all your degrees there and then what were your majors?

SS: Just my undergraduate degree is from Minnesota. I had really two majors. One in Agricultural Economics and then Animal Science. I was interested...very much interested in genetics. I was hoping to be one of the world's great geneticists. I don't regret...ever, ever regret ending up in economics 'cause I loved it.

LL: Where did you then...you left Minnesota and went where?

SS: I left it in March 1940 and came to Connecticut to do an apple marketing study that summer for the United States Department of Agriculture. I was on their payroll I’d not made up my mind yet about graduate work… I couldn’t believe that any agriculture of any importance resided in Connecticut. UCONN was a topnotch school in Ag Economics, had a good national reputation so I had applied here but I really wasn't hoping to come here.

LL: Who was the Department Head then, do you remember?

SS: Hammerberg and he took over shortly after the death of I.G. Davis who died the previous year. And Hammerberg was only Head of th.er Department a couple of years and then he became Connecticut Milk Administrator for the next twenty-five years or thereabouts. He was appointed by the Governor…,
and remained in that position some twenty-five years.

LL: So when you came to do the apples' study what happened?

SS: Well, we got the publication out, the first real publication that I ever had my name on, I guess. Then I got to like conn very much and I decided to stay and take their offer for graduate work at the University of Connecticut. So I stayed...started my graduate work ...at the Master's level. They didn't have a Ph.D. Program in 1940. I graduated in 1942. And joined the staff in as soon as I completed my Master's degree. Actually, I guess it was a little bit before that I was appointed as an Instructor. In those days, we had Instructors. I guess we don't have that anymore.

LL: It's still on the books.

SS: Chuckle. Nobody's an instructor these days. I went to the University of Chicago in the early 1950’s, and eventually received my Ph.D. in Economics.

LL: In reg...straight Economics not Ag Economics?

SS: Yes...there really isn't any difference. The theories in the economics are the same as in Ag Economics. It's just that in Ag Economics, we generally deal with problems in agriculture as compared with the general economy. I feel capable with my training in Chicago of doing work on the National Budget or tax problems. I just don't like that. I'd sooner work with futures markets and potatoes and wheat and corn and so forth.

LL: Did you come from an agricultural background, family?

SS: Oh, yes, yes. A little town of six hundred. I was born and raised on a farm. We didn't stay there very long because we had just a terribly small little farm in dairy. My dad went to work for the local creamery in the little town of Bertha.

LL: In Minnesota?

SS: Yes in Minnesota, central Minnesota. He sold the farm and we never farmed after that. But with three boys in the family, you had to work. So, I started work when I was a sophomore for farmers around the...the area and...they always looked for me in the little town. I was a hard worker and gave them a day’s work for a day's wages. I should just add one story as to why I hate banks. In 1935, I...I was out of school one year, 1934, the winter of 1934/35 and I. went to work for a farmer in the spring of 1935 for a dollar a day. He had an older son, and we milked he seventeen cows by hand, cooled the milk by seven thirty in the morning and then you were off to the fields. And he didn't really have any...no money, a big mortgage on the farm with the local bank and he kept getting behind on his wages at one dollar a day. And like I've always said, I still have sixty dollars, of that one dollar a day owed me because the bank wouldn't release the bushel of oats or a bushel of wheat or a cow or a calf or dog or whatever just to pay for the wages. I've never seen my dad, never...never saw my dad so angry when he took me in as a young boy to the bank and they wouldn't do a thing either, "You are cheating an eighteen year old boy out of his wages at a dollar a day. I can't believe that you could be that cruel." That's...that's my...my experience, one of my big experiences.

LL: With a bank, yeah. Would you talk about some of the...how did you...I...I particularly ask you...I know you have a very broad background in Agricultural Economics, but we need to spend time, because of Connecticut, talking about your work with the railroads and...and again, I don't know much about it other than reading that it was an issue in the midwest and I thought it was important to talk about what
was happening with the railroads in Connecticut and agriculture.

SS: Oh, well, it became a...a major issue here for quite a few years, probably ten to fifteen years, because of our importation of protein feed from the Midwest. In other words, the corn and the oats or barley or wheat or whatever you used in both dairy and poultry feed came from the midwest and for many, many years it came in on one carload at a time. Finally, they got up to where it was generally...rates were based on three cars at one time and that's about all that the smaller feed mixers could take care of and had storage for.

LL: What years would that have been?

SS: Well, let me...do you want to just turn...

(Tape interruption.)

In the...early '60's to the early '80's, a period of about twenty years that we were essentially fighting the railroad rates including hearings before the Interstate Commerce Commission. One of my...I was at one time the Economist that worked for essentially, with the grain trade in New England by going to a hearings before the ICC Commission for reduction in freight rates, from the midwest to the northeast and I include New York and...and New England. And we lost the case and that was one of the more devastating blows that I'd ever had in my professional life 'cause I was so convinced that we could...win the case.

LL: Do you want to talk about some of the issues that were...what...what were the problems that the people in the New England States were facing?

SS: Well, the problem was really the rates on protein feeds, corn especially since that's basic feed ingredient in the feed concentrates, animal feed concentrates, were much cheaper to the southeast...especially in poultry, eggs and broiler production for our great competitor, important competitor. And they were anywhere from three to six dollars per ton cheaper rail rates into the southeast than they were in New England. We became interested in that phenomena and so we started some research in the Department and that’s how it grew. Then cases before the ICC reached Congress because the U.S. Department of Agriculture at one time,...even had a lower rate that they subsidized transportation to the southeast and not to the northeast we won that in Congress. They took away...the freight subsidy to the southeast region.

LL: What do you think caused this to happen? In a politically or businesswise...I mean, who were the railroad companies and why did this exist?

SS: Well, the railroads have always been very, very strong politically over the years. It’s probably true that the Interstate Commerce Commission, which was created in the late 1800's, has really always been sort or pro-railroads. And so the railroads could go to the Interstate Commerce Commission and generally get a hearing that said, “This is the rates that we propose and that we want from Chicago to Manchester, Connecticut” or wherever it might be.

LL: Was it in part because we didn't buy enough, here, in quantity and the southeast had more in the way of...?

SS: No, I don't think...that's really the essence of it. It's...it's true that they could go in from the south and say, Well, why don't you give us a three car rate. If there's enough pressure put on the ICC to approve three car rates than you have those generally available to the southeast as well as to the northeast. If you
compare mileages to the northeast and to the southeast on corn, let's say, from Midwest origins. They were three to six dollars per ton cheaper to the southeast than it was to Connecticut and the northeast. That was the real problem. All those producers in the southwest had a cash advantage in producing. Advantaging producer

LL: Why? You said the issues...well, the interstate commerce but politically, what set up the northeast or the New England to be non-competitive in their m...I mean, what political pressures were there against...?

SS: Just more... political pressure from the southeast. Essentially...when you go before the Interstate Commerce Commission you get the Senators and Congressmen, behind you. And we were never organized to do that. I think probably the first time that anybody from the northeast took it to the political arena, was in protesting the subsidy. That I mentioned a few moments ago. The USDA had for a number of years subsidized producers in the southeast; and wasn't available to us. So we opened a case on that in the Congressional records, especially the issue of May 15, 1963. You will find long arguments in the United States Senate by the Senators from the northeast wanting something done about the advantage in freight rates enjoyed by the southeast producers and how that was contributing to problems and net prices to our producers of milk and broilers and eggs.

LL: Did...did people believe that there wasn't that...enough agriculture here because of the...the mills and the industry and the industries that they were...that we were known for and thus they discounted agriculture?

SS: No, it's just that the southeast had the power to do this before the Interstate Commerce Commission, then the USDA, political power put on the United States Department of Agriculture, and the Secretary, to give them the subsidy that was finally done away with, mainly because the Senators from the northeast really put on a very strong protest in the United States Senate and said, "We're not going to live with this anymore. Something has to be done because the northeast producer is at a disadvantage in the marketplace compared to the southeast producer. There's no reason why Congress should ever allow that to exist. All we ask is equal competition, equal access to the markets."

LL: So what kind of research did you do then in preparation? You said you worked with the cooperative and then what did you do?

SS: Well, it really involved everything including water transportation. We did work on that including much larger storage which finally was approved and was built here in the northeast and in Connecticut so that you could get...lower rate.

LL: Now they had to have permission to do that?

SS: Well, the only way you could get unit train rates, instead of the three car rates, which was in effect, would be to say we can take fifty to a hundred cars. You had to have the storage for it. And the northeast had to do something about obtaining storage...

LL: Privately, private industry did that?

SS: Yes, oh yes. We did the storage studies here at Connecticut. Eventually some of the university in the northeast became involved, but it started here at the University of Connecticut.

LL: What about the water? Shipping on the water?
SS: Well, sure. You bring grain out of New Orleans cheap. Transportation from the Midwest to New Orleans via Mississippi River is a...long story. Essentially you put grain on small ships or barges from New Orleans into ports here in New England. And of course, water transportation is so cheap that we took a look at that and yes, it was true that that could have been a viable way of transporting grain. But then you had to build storage facilities on the water. But then you couldn't afford the expenses of trucking the grain to inland plants. That was one of the things that kind of distracted from finally deciding to ahead with water transportation. But at least it was looked into and discarded. It was a comprehensive look and evaluation of transportation in grains for the whole area of New England.

LL: When did trucking help...or did trucking help alleviate this control the railroad had?

SS: No, not for the distances involved. From Midwest origin to New England six hundred to a thousand miles. You can't do it for a profitable rate and beat the railroads on that kind of transportation. Cause this you know, the rail can move a lot of grain and that's how we got the consideration of what they call unitrains, generally defined as fifty to a hundred cars of ninety to a hundred tons per car and that would take, a lot of trucks.

LL: Now once...so when it arrived here, how was it distributed? The grain: Is that where the cooperatives came in?

SS: Oh, yes. But also private frames. We have private feed companies in the area. So you had to have those plants located on the railroad someplace in the area. We had...one of the biggest in Manchester and another two, mixing plants out of Norwich on the railroads. So that plants had to be attached to a railroad.

LL: And did they join in the...did they exist before in...in their business? When did they occur and did they help in the...in the battle if you will?

SS: All three of the plants that I’m talking about were in business prior to the early '60's when our studies started and when the issue of freight rates and water transportation was being considered and where the battle was eventually shifted to Congress.

LL: Did...were there other...what about the other side of the State, the northwest side of the State because they...well, in the Connecticut River Valley. Now they were...the northwest part of the State would have been grain for...for dairy. Were they at all involved in any of that?

SS: Oh sure. Any plants though, mixing plant, would have to be located on a railroad of some kind. On a branch line or access to siding where they could push these cars to one side because most any place you know, it takes them a little while to unload those cars and get...grain in the storage. So all the area...in the west and northwest of Connecticut would be mostly dairy. The...the poultry industry, both eggs and broilers require a lot more total feed for...than dairy supplements in terms of pounds and feed mixed.

LL: And the poultry was primarily on the eastern side?

SS: That’s right. So it became a matter of the size of the feed industry -- more feed was required...in the eastern section of Connecticut than in the dairy area in the west.

LL: As you worked with the...the Congressional delegation to go to Washington to talk about eliminating the subsidy, did they connect with you or did you connect with them or was an intermediary who...who knew of your research? How did you get involved with them?
SS: There was a mediator most of the time when politics was concerned. As you well know, people from the University and the University Extension Service can talk to the politicians and bring problems to their attention but industry representatives are generally necessary in pleading the case before law makers and others. So we generally worked through representatives of the industry rather than going directly to the politician and have the representatives bring to the politician in mind, work that is done, research that is completed at the University and what it means and why something needs to be done.

LL: And you started this as your own identification of this as a problem or did someone from the industry come to you or were they both happening at the same time?

SS: No, I'm very certain that... originally us becoming involved was generally the group here at the University saying, "Aha, this looks like something that ought to be investigated. It's been a problem in the past and it's going to get worse in the future. Let's see what we can do about it." And then keeping the...coops and private firm representative apprised of what we're doing. I was always in favor...of that approach when I was doing work like feed transportation and storage.

LL: Now you mentioned this Congressional hearing in 1963. Did...did you actually...sometimes we're called in to be expert witness and then we're allowed to testified rather than volunteering to testify or arranging it. Did you go or did you provide information materials?

SS: Provided information and materials to people in the private sector to take to the Congressmen. Now, often you went along with them and to the meetings but you don't appear in print anywhere in the Congressional Record for May 15, 1963. You'll never find my name. Of course, that's the way that the Congress operates. Unless you are retained as a employee of one of their standing committees, you're not going to be in the Congressional Record.

LL: Now did they...let's just say the Ag Committee...or this was Interstate Commerce Committee that you...that was...?

SS: No, no. This is Congress.

LL: All right, but did it...was it a subcommittee hearing or was it actually at a Senate hearing?

SS: I'm talking about our finding being discussed on the floor of the Senate

LL: What kind of...

SS: The record that I'm talking about is...is the floor record.

LL: Okay. What kind of homework had they done in their subcommittees? You said it was a disappointment because eventually it didn't win. So someone else...so beside the railroad companies, who else was doing the homework?

SS: Oh well,...let me make this very clear. The ICC is the regulatory Interstate Commerce Commission, the regulatory commission who holds hearings. Yes, you can appear before them to give testimony pro or con on the rates, at any rate hearing that they are conducting. You can't appear on the floor of the Senate or the House and get your name in the Record and generally you don't get your name in the Record unless you are a member of some Senate or House committee, Chairman of it or committee members of it. That's what I'm saying. So yeah, in here you'll find many of the Senators, Aiken, he was one of the leaders in the Senate, from Vermont. Senator Aiken from
Vermont, at that time. But there are a number of others in here that appeared to support this removal or the really, the removal of the USDA subsidy to transportation to the southeast, without making it available to the northeast.

LL: And that one was successful?

SS: That one was successful and two weeks after this record was made, the subsidy to the southeast was removed.

LL: Did it create enemies for future work?

SS: Oh, no. I don't think so.

LL: I mean the southern...the southern Congresspeople.

SS: Oh, no. I...in a way I suppose it... did because they lost a pretty nice subsidy and that meant that we were in a better position. Our producers were in the better position of competing with the southeast for market in, Philadelphia, Chicago, for example.

LL: Did...so now, what about the one that you...that was not successful? What was the...the situation for the one that you said was such a disappointment to you?

SS: Well, see the...the feed industry brought a case, from the northeast... before the Interstate Commerce Commission. I was essentially the economic consultant to the various interests in this area. The expert I prepared testimony and then prepared a long statement when we lost the rebuttal. Both were filed with the ICC.

LL: But what did you lose? I mean, what was the issue?

SS: Oh, rates again. Rates. But it was the three car rate that time.

LL: And this one took place ten years later?

SS: Approximately.

LL: And so there was a...another...over the intervening time, the rates had gone up or had again become...?

SS: Oh, the rates had changed a number of times over that period.

LL: And the northeast...

SS: And always...always the northeast...it was just relatively, we're gonna raise _to the northeast, we're gonna raise by jive per cent at some such and such a date and to the southeast we're gonna raise it by four per cent or whatever.

LL: What was their argument, that it cost them more to get it out here? How could they justify it? How were they trying to justify it? Or how did they justify it?

SS: The… Interstate Commerce Commission was established back in the late 1800 s, and it was almost certain to be very sympathetic to the railroads. For one thing, the railroads, back when the
Interstate Commerce Commission was approved, were very powerful both politically and economic. They were powerful. Most people in the United States, even Senators and Congressmen would bow down to the railroads. And millions and billions were made on owning railroads.

LL: In the late 1800's?

SS: Yes, and early 1900's. And that was the ICC history going into the 1960's. There might have been some changes in this but they still had that kind transportation of unique position being the only...available transportation running through an area, especially on grains, So when the railroad said “we've got to have more money”…that meant something. Now, the rules are such that you have to hold a hearing to establish what it is so the railroads want and they must present evidence at a hearing. that… Let me just read a very little.

If I interrupt you, it's because the tape's run out and we'll have to stop and turn it over.

The opening statement by the Interstate Commerce Commission on feed grains to New England. The opening paragraph says: Assailed three-car eastern mileage scale of rates on feed corn from Midwestern origins to the northeast found to be unjust and unreasonable to certain destinations in Maine and a reverse taper in said mileage scale found to be unjust and unreasonable from the five hundred to six hundred mile level thereof Failure of the Eastern Railroad response to establish multicar rates on feed corn from Midwestern origins to the northeast found to be unreasonable, in violation of Section 1.6. Ten-car rates ordered established pursuant to Section 15.1. So we got a ten-car rate but that didn't really solve things.

LL: But it was...that one was successful?

SS: The whole long hearing essentially didn't do anything to reverse or change the...the competitive rates between the northeast and the southeast and that's what the whole thing was about. We were getting killed especially in producing broilers and eggs...broilers and eggs more so than in milk since that is kind of a special case. You don't get shipments of milk from the southeast into the northeast, even these days, because of the nature of the milk markets and establishment of prices. But that's not true of either eggs or broilers. So these products move freely from one market to another. If I have some advantage I increase production and therefore take more eggs and broilers to market. And there is no doubt that from the time the freight rate issue was developing. Connecticut produced something like, thirty million broilers a year, which is not large compared to the southeast where a lot of the broilers are produced, but it's an awfully important thirty million. And it went downhill from that point to its extinction essentially, some time ago, analysis indicates that one of the reasons for rapid reduction in New England was freight rates. And part of it was the fact that we couldn't win cases before the Interstate Commerce Commission. Just couldn't win 'em.

LL: Okay, what was the membership on the Interstate Commerce Commission? Who did the appointing?

SS: I don't remember the members of the Commission.

LL: Because that would talk about how powerful they were and where they were leaning.

SS: I don't know who...I don't know. That I don't know. I don't know who the committee is. There's my review. It involved, oh my Lord, that involved a lot of work. Oh ho, this whole thing. Here was the original...

LL: And they didn't have any competition.
It's fixed, thank you. I'll read them. I really will. Do you...do you want me to make copies and give these right back to you soon.

SS: Unbelievable filing. Oh no.

LL: I'll make sure you get these back.

SS: No, but it's the only copies of, oh my god, I...I really kind of wanted...

LL: I'll will make copies and get them back to you.

SS: Well, you don't...if you just hang on to all...all this...

LL: All right.

SS: Publications are the only things that I have.

LL: Okay.

SS: These...I've got others...I...I don't even have a...I don't have myself. I couldn't find them anywhere.

LL: No, I'll make...I...I don't like to hold on to them. I'll make copies.

SS: Well, I think...I think all this you maybe should gander through. In terms of...the ICC hearings, I really worked through this Alpert. The northeast industry, both private and...and co-ops, hired a firm locate in Washington D.C. to represent their interest. This guy Alpert Bord and Sherrill Burke were the firms representatives...I did a lot of work with...with...with them. They were up here on a representation number of occasion. Then these...Cready was an industry guy. Jesse Friedman, William Horton, Carl Lessing, Chapman Stalkford, Dean Kay Webster, were the petitioners. Webster was the large private feed manufacturing firm. I guess they're still in business. They were very terrific.

LL: Uh hmm, okay.

SS: The Board of Trade of the City of Chicago. The National Grange the Seaway Port Authority of Duluth also testified.

LL: But you know, the other side of that is you contributed something very special and it's...when politics is in there, I mean, you have...it's just.

SS: Oh, I understand. But I was so sure that… we could win the case.

LL: That right would prevail.

SS: ...I was the main… source of evidence presented by all those individuals previously mentioned and thought we caused win the darn case.

LL: Now, it says here, Investigation discontinued. That's what they did. They...they decided that it was nothing that was...that it was not...
SS: Yeah, oh yeah. Well, you...you wouldn’t need to read...you might need to read a little bit.

LL: I mean, I’ll scan over all these things.

SS: You may pick up the flavor of the issue from my 20 page rebuttal...that’s my rebuttal. You’ll see my - I guess there’s some nasty hand written notes in the margin. Don’t…read those.

LL: But you see, the first...you were successful. I keep thinking about you were successful in several of them and just the final one and what did that final one do compared to what the first ones in which you were successful did? How was it different?

SS: It was very different because it was a -you know a case before the ICC, which is an all powerful organization for all transportation. They’re in charge of all transportation. Water and trucks...

LL: And now our roads.

SS: Yeah, they’re powerful and that’s a bit different than going through the USDA, taking them on, you know. That, I’m kind of familiar with. I...just a lot in here with kind of the same thing. I went down to the USDA and what a nice beautiful one.

LL: What was that meeting?

SS: On feed and the subsidy to the Southeast.

LL: There are other New England States the subsidy bothered too.

SS: Yes and Mike Hirth and Joe Gill the Conn. Commission of Agriculture, and Maine representation all went to Washington to a meeting called by the Sec. of Agriculture.

SS: We went down to Washington. We left Hartford about ten or eleven o’clock, drove to La Guardia airport and arrive in Washington at 2:00 A.M.
And we don’t know to this day how the hell they ever got our address but here was a big package of evidence from the USDA saying that you guys are wrong...We had a hearing with the Secretary and...some of his staff at nine o’clock in the morning, And you and were...were just down in the dumps. I kept saying, “They haven’t said a damn thing. They haven’t proved a damn thing...don’t worry, don’t worry.” That sounds like me, “Don’t worry, we got this thing licked.” We go into the meeting with twenty-five people probably in a room. It didn’t take more than about five or ten minutes and I said, “What the hell are you guys talking about?” They were saying... Here these jerks are from out there in the country, what the hell are we wasting our time for? “You guys don’t even know what your own right hand is doing. Let me tell you something. Those are not the prices nor the...official rates. Somehow or other, you guys have screwed up ‘cause I have the right rates and if you’ll just look at it, we’ve got a case.” So they send one of their lieutenants from the meeting and we sit there, And chatted about the weather and sports and whatever it might have been. I don’t even remember. Finally the guy came back after being gone a half-hour... “Well, Joe, what’s...what’s the story?” Well, I guess Seaver’s right. I guess Seaver is right. “Well, how could that be?” So he had to go through the story that they published the wrong data so Seaver’s right. Well the meeting, of course, was over in about ten minutes. I can never forget Joe and Mike throwing their arms around me and hugged and kissed me. So you have some winners, you have some losers. I guess, that’s life. But anyway, that was one of my big winners and in just two weeks that they changed the damn thing. They… eliminated the southeast subsidy.
LL: And what was...what was that one about? It was about rates again?

SS: Yes, oh yes...Well, it was about the subsidy of rate to the southeast. That had to go. So that’s a bit different than taking a case before the Interstate Commerce Commission.

LL: What brought you...what has brought you greatest satisfaction when you were on the faculty here? The greatest joy?

SS: Oh, I guess, graduate students. It’s kind of a question I’ve never had before. I’ve given you an awfully quick answer I think. I...but...I...I think that’s probably the right answer. I was very close to the graduate students. And this extended to both professionally and personal issues. I was a great believer in “you ought to work hard and play hard”. So I enjoyed parties and I enjoyed golf and most of the time I graduate students. When I was visiting professor at the University of California, I got to playing with the graduate students and we had an uppity staff member...that I played with occasionally and he wanted to know if I wanted to go golfing tomorrow, “Oh, yeah, come on. Why don’t you join us? I’m going out with the grad students”. He wasn’t going to play with any graduate students. “Why don’t you join us?” he said. “No, I couldn’t do that because I promised to play with the grad students and I’m going to keep my promise, so thank you very much.” So I ended up his...on his list, I guess, of stupid people or something. But, again, the graduate students were involved.

LL: Were they involved in...in the research of...of your...this type too, that they were part of this?

SS: Oh yeah. Oh yes. Yes. Some of them, some...some were. Some were involved in this. Although Bill Hanekamp was, you know, was on the staff payroll, he wasn’t a member...he did a lot of work with me. Ah, these two publications are Hanekamp and Seaver and Haincamp. Anyway...

LL: Well, I appreciate very, very much you taking the time to do this because it was a piece and I will do some reading.

SS: Well, if you can think of any...

LL: I will. I might come back and talk to you again about it because I have heard from the poultry people. I interviewed several of the producers and they...they didn’t mention shipping, they mentioned labor force going south and that...that it was hard to compete but they haven’t mentioned yet shipping only because I didn’t ask them the question, probably.

SS: No. The current producers I suppose, unless somebody would have brought this sort of thing to their attention, would never even know about it.

LL: So were they...the...the Finnish community had a lot of poultry farms at the time?

SS: Oh, yes. Finnish people were dominate in eastern Connecticut from Willimantic to the Rhode Island border. Had a graduate student Hakala, a good Finnish student got his Ph.D....No, he didn’t I ever finish it up. Smart kid. Went to Alaska. Never...never really got it.

LL: What year did you retire?

SS: Oh, probably like the early ’80’s. Well, yeah. Before ’85. I forget, like ‘83 ‘84 I think.

LL: ‘Cause that’ll put it in context. Thank you very, very much.
(End of Interview)